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Abstract 
The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) Risk Governance Framework identifies five inter-
dependent phases, of which the final phase, Communication, is of the utmost importance because 
effective communication is the key to creating public trust in disaster risk management. Extant 
government reports on the 2005 Hurricane Katrina and the 2009 Victoria bushfires in Australia (2009 
Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 2010) provide evidence that disaster communication governance 
deficits contribute to the slow disaster response and recovery operations and the erosion of public trust in 
government disaster management. 
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insufficiently defined governance model for interorganizational collaboration 
under EE conditions, and (b) soft variables such as incompatible 
organizational cultures and practices. The governance model for EE response 
and recovery management needs to be negotiated and determined prior to the 
EE, otherwise frictions in the response efforts are inevitable. Also, while the 
technologies and organizational procedures might be technically sound, soft 
factors related to different or diverging organizational cultures and informal 
practices may interfere and make collaboration problematic and reduced in 
effectiveness. 
 
Information and Information Needs. In EE management, information is the 
most valuable resource to responders, particularly, when geo-coded, 
current/updated, filtered/focused to task, and responder/purpose specific. 
While information asymmetries among EE responders are inescapable, the 
distribution of information should be open and forthcoming. Computer-
mediated communication and social networking services have emerged as 
self-organizing complements to traditional channels for sharing and 
disseminating information. While high accuracy and quality of information 
are keys to trust in the shared information among responders, the principle of 
“satisfacing” in terms of timeliness relative completeness in EE response 
management has been emphasized. 
 
Interoperability and ICTs.  Institutional (enterprise-type) architectures, 
which integrate and help interoperate diverse ICTs, allow for virtual 
command and control centers across collaborating agencies and the use of 
shared knowledge bases in an EE. Due to built-in robustness and redundancy 
such ICTs can also maintain two-way communication even when major 
communication infrastructures are incapacitated. Geographical Information 
Systems are the backbone of such systems. In recent EE, computer-mediated 
communication via social networking systems have begun to play a major as 
self-organizing mechanism for informing the general public but also as a 
feedback mechanism conveying important EE-related information to 
responders in a timely fashion. 
As case in point, the panel presentation assesses the readiness of field 
operations in a local government in terms of the capacity of switching from 
daily routine operations to EE response management along the lines of the 
four major areas of interest. 
 
* * * * * 
 
A CASE STUDY RESEARCH ON TROUBLE AND FAILURE OF 
INFORMATION SYSTEM IN AN EMERGENCY PERIOD OF 
DISASTERS 
 
Michinori Hatayama and Megumi Ando 
Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University, Japan
 
 
After Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake various emergency management 
systems based on ICT were developed and installed to local government. 
However information issues in an emergency period of disasters were not 
fixed up completely and in addition some new problems have arisen from 
new technology. 
 
Our goal is to develop reliable information system which can use 
immediately after disaster and in this paper we consider factors of troubles 
and failures of information system under disaster to clarify the vulnerabilities. 
In this presentation we report troubles and failures cases in the Great East 
Japan Earthquake and past disaster in Japan and try to classify into 
categories. 
 
* * * * * 
 
DISASTER COMMUNICATION GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC 
TRUST: THE CASE OF TEPCO  
 
Akemi Takeoka Chatfield, Ph.D.
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 & Mary Barrett, Ph.D.
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1. University of Wollongong, Faculty of Informatics, School of Information Systems & 
Technology; akemi@uow.edu.au 
2. University of Wollongong, Faculty of Commerce, School of Management & Marketing 
 
The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) Risk Governance 
Framework identifies five inter-dependent phases, of which the final phase, 
Communication, is “of the utmost importance” because effective 
communication is the key to creating public trust in disaster risk management 
(IRGC, 2005, p. 14).  Extant government reports on the 2005 Hurricane 
Katrina (GAO 2006; GAO 2007; GAO 2010) and the 2009 Victoria bushfires 
in Australia (2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 2010) provide 
evidence that disaster communication governance deficits contribute to the 
slow disaster response and recovery operations and the erosion of public trust 
in government disaster management.  A better understanding of the 
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and public trust is critically important to improve vertical and lateral disaster 
information sharing practice. This paper addresses this research need by 
exploring two objectives: (1) to understand the Tokyo Electric Power 
Company (TEPCO) disaster communication governance over the failures at 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plants in Japan, “the most prepared of nations” 
(Time 2011) through case study analysis, archival analysis, and corporate 
website content analysis; and (2) to compare and contrast the TEPCO 
communication governance practice vis-à-vis the research literatures on 
leadership in crisis, corporate governance, and information technology (IT) 
governance to enhance disaster communication governance and build public 
trust. 
 
TEPCO owns and operates the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (6 
nuclear plants), Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station (4 nuclear plants), 
and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station (7 nuclear plants).  The 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station’s safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) 
triggered the shutdown of the facility when it was struck by a magnitude 9.0 
earthquake on March 11, 2011. However, the backup generator damaged by 
the tsunami failed to cool the over-heating reactors and fuel rods, releasing 
radiation leak.  Japan’s Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency rated the 
nuclear disaster at a level 5, which is classified as a crisis. 
 
TEPCO is aware of earthquake risks on its nuclear plants. The Kashiwazaki-
Kariwa Nuclear Power Station in Niigata prefecture was struck by the 2007 
Niigata Chuetsu-Oki earthquake. The ground motion sensors recorded “the 
site experienced nearly twice the ground shaking that was considered in the 
plant design”, exceeding 0.5 g (Global Risk Miyamoto 2007, p. 60).  TEPCO 
reported no major structural damage to the nuclear plants.  The Kyodo News 
Agency reported that about 100 drums containing radioactive waste material 
had fallen, releasing radiation leak.  While TEPCO downplayed the reported 
radiation risk, the seven nuclear plants were shut down after the leak was 
verified. 
 
Despite the previous earthquake risk experience, TEPCO leadership during 
the recent nuclear crisis was slow in sharing disaster information with key 
stakeholders. According to Japanese and international mass media, both 
Japan’s concerned citizen groups and international nuclear experts claimed 
that TEPCO and Japan’s central government were underplaying the crisis’ 
severity and misrepresenting information about the nuclear disaster risk. 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano admitted that “information had not 
been shared quickly enough.” (Talmadge & Yamaguchi 2011)  The paper 
discusses the key findings and insights by addressing the two research 
objectives. 
 
13. DISASTER MANGEMENT 
CHAIR:  WILLIAM PETAK 
 
LOCAL LEADERSHIP AND NETWORK: A 
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Providing effective emergency responses to large scale disasters in China has 
become one of the key responsibilities of national, provincial and local 
governments. Besides, more and more nonprofit organizations and business 
agencies, both local and international, have committed themselves to 
participate from different perspectives into emergency management. 
However, it is also one of the most complex endeavors with great amount of 
uncertainties for every single actor or collaborative initiatives to work 
together effectively. The feasibility and effectiveness of the policy is not only 
challenged by the de facto segregation between public sectors and other 
actors, but also by the asymmetry of essential information, the heterogeneity 
of local communities, as well as the emerging complexity driven by 
interconnected and adaptive local people who spontaneously respond to such 
disasters in different patterns. Considering such factors, even a most in-time, 
well-resourced, and highly-integrated policy can be easily crippled in the 
community level, especially in rural areas where local government officials in 
such complex settings have much less incentives or capability to pay 
attention to.  
 
This paper intends to optimistically provide a rationale for understanding the 
microfoundation of effective disaster response in rural China after Wenchuan 
Earthquake. Adopting E. Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD) Framework and the philosophy of network analysis into the case, a 
model of local leadership and emerging network within the community has 
been established. On the one hand, it describes the dynamic structure which 
integrates the interactive residents, local government officials, and external 
aid organizations together; one the other hand, it explains a possible bottom-
up process of learning which helps to maintain their community’s resilience 
